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Let me begin with a confession. My papers are often praised more for their titles than for their contents.
At a job interview a few years ago, I was told that if I didn’t have a future in philosophy (hardly the words
one wants to hear during a job interview), the quality of my titles suggested that I could always pursue a
career in advertising. What, I was asked, was my secret? I declined to reveal my secret at the time, for fear
of appearing shallow (it didn’t help; I didn’t get the job). But I am going to go ahead and reveal my secret
now: my approach to philosophical research has always been to start with a good title and then try to figure
out what I would have to write about in order to use it. I have been planning for some time, for example, to
write a paper on the phenomenology of insect abuse, just so that I could call it “What is it Like to Bat a
Bee?”
This paper is no exception. The title had been kicking around in the back of my head for some time,
waiting for an appropriate topic to go with it, when inspiration arrived one day in the form of a letter from
an animal welfare organization asking me for money. The letter made the following argument: two of the
greatest sources of preventable animal suffering are factory farming and the overpopulation of cats and
dogs. We could end the former by opposing the practice of meat eating, and we could end the latter by
supporting the practice of spaying and neutering. But, the letter pointed out, there is tremendous and
deeply-entrenched resistance to abolishing meat eating, both at the individual and the institutional level,
while there is no such resistance to expanding the practice of spaying and neutering cats and dogs at either
level. There is simply a lack of funding. So rather than use my somewhat meager means (since I did not, in
the end, pursue a career in advertising) to oppose factory farming by supporting groups such as PETA
(People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals), the letter concluded, I should instead send my money to
them to promote spaying and neutering.
From a strictly utilitarian point of view, of course, the letter’s argument was irreproachable. My duty, on
such a view, is to prevent as much suffering1 as I can, and if my contributing to pro-spaying efforts
prevents more suffering than does my contributing to anti-factory farming efforts, then that is just what I
should do. But I am not a utilitarian. I do not oppose factory farming on the utilitarian grounds that it fails
to promote the most overall happiness for humans and nonhumans, though surely it does fail to maximize
such happiness. Rather, I oppose it on the deontological grounds that animals have certain rights which
practices such as factory farming violate. And I suspect that this is true for many people who support such
groups as PETA. PETA’s slogan, after all, is not that animals should be used so as to produce the greatest
good for the greatest number of humans and nonhumans, but rather that “animals are not ours to eat, wear,
or experiment on.” So the letter’s argument did not convince me that I should use my limited resources to
support spaying rather than to oppose factory farming, and I believe that it should not convince others
whose support for such groups as PETA arises from reasoning that is similar to mine.
But the letter did nonetheless prompt the following unsettling concern. I oppose factory farming and I
support spaying and neutering dogs and cats. And it is easy to see how these two positions can be rendered
consistent from a consequentialist point of view. But it is less easy to see how they can be rendered
consistent on the deontological, rights-based view suggested by PETA’s slogan. Indeed, I came to realize, it
is downright difficult. After all, when we spay a cat we typically justify our act by saying that it is
warranted because it will prevent others from suffering, not by claiming that it is in the cat’s own interest to
be spayed. A common bumper sticker advocating spaying and neutering reads simply: “There are not
enough homes for all of them. Spay or neuter your pet,” and I have yet to see one that says “sterilize your
pets: they’ll be glad you did.” Yet justifying the imposition of costs on one animal by appealing to the
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benefits that this imposition will provide to others seems to be paradigmatic of the sort of position that is
ruled out by a rights-based approach, even when the others involved are other animals and not human
beings. This suggests that a proponent of animal rights should be an opponent of spaying and neutering,
that we can support such practices only by robbing groups like PETA not only of some of their financial
support, but also of the theoretical support that underwrites their positions (hence the title of this paper). I
should state clearly at the outset that I do not welcome this suggestion. But I believe that it cannot easily be
defeated, and that it therefore demands more attention than it has thus far received in the literature on
animal rights.
I want here, then, to do three things. First, I will state the problem for the rights-based position more
clearly, by putting it in the context of the best-known presentation of that view, that developed by Tom
Regan in The Case for Animal Rights. Second, I will consider whether Regan’s position provides any
resources for justifying the practices of spaying and neutering. I will conclude, although not happily, that
the claim that animals have rights, at least as that claim is understood and defended by writers such as
Regan, does imply that spaying and neutering cats and dogs is, at least in general, morally impermissible.
Finally, I will consider the question of how we should respond to the conclusion that Regan’s position has
this implication.
I.
Let me begin with a more explicit statement of the problem. On Regan’s account, all individuals who
satisfy what he calls the subject-of-a-life criterion have the right to respectful treatment (sec. 8.4). To be a
subject-of-a-life is to have a certain kind of psychophysical identity over time (p. 243), and Regan argues
that at least normal mammalian animals aged one or more are best understood as having this sort of identity
(chaps. 1-3). To have the right to respectful treatment is to have the right that one’s inherent value be
respected (p. 277), and respecting an individual’s inherent value requires that we not harm the individual
just so that we can “bring about the best aggregate consequences for everyone” (p. 249). To say that an
individual P has a right to respectful treatment, in short, is to say that the fact that harming P is likely to
produce better consequences overall cannot count as a justification for harming P. And this, I take it, is
representative of what most non-consequentialists mean when they maintain that at least some nonhuman
animals have moral rights.
But now consider what happens when, for example, we spay2 a cat, say Fluffy. This act imposes a
variety of harms on Fluffy. Fluffy must be confined and taken to the vet, placed in unfamiliar surroundings,
exposed to a frightening environment. Most animals who go through such procedures will surely
experience a great deal of anxiety if not outright fear and terror. In addition, Fluffy must either be given a
general anesthesia, which can cause a variety of adverse reactions and in some cases even death, or suffer a
tremendous amount of physical pain during the procedure. The procedure itself exposes Fluffy to nonnegligible risks of various infections and of complications that can arise from incomplete removal of the
organs or from excessive bleeding. And when the procedure is over, she will suffer from a general
disorientation as well as nausea and physical discomfort, lasting in some cases for several days. So on the
whole, the harm to Fluffy, while not as serious as many other harms we routinely impose on animals, is
more than trivial. If precisely this kind and amount of harm were imposed on Fluffy in order to test the
safety of some new shampoo or hair spray, there is no doubt that Regan’s view would commit him to the
conclusion that this would be a violation of Fluffy’s right to respectful treatment. And there is no doubt that
organizations such as PETA would oppose such a practice as well. Of course, the benefits we typically
appeal to in justifying the spaying of Fluffy are not as trivial as the benefits of producing a new shampoo or
hair spray. The benefits are quite substantial. But they are not benefits to Fluffy. The benefits we appeal to
are simply those which follow from reducing the population of unwanted animals: less overall suffering.
And if Fluffy has the right to respectful treatment, then these benefits cannot provide a moral warrant for
our behavior. So if Regan’s theory is right, then spaying Fluffy is wrong.
As I have said, I do not welcome this result, and I do not believe that Regan would welcome it either.
How, on Regan’s account, might it be avoided? One possibility can quickly be dismissed: we could deny
the claim that spaying Fluffy harms her by complaining that my account of Fluffy’s mental life is naively
anthropomorphic. Some behaviorists, for example, might deny that Fluffy is capable of experiencing the
sorts of pains, anxieties, disorientations and discomforts I counted as the harms spaying inflicts on her. But
Regan clearly cannot appeal to such considerations, since they would undermine the basis for his
attributing rights to Fluffy in the first place.
A second possible response to the problem I have identified is in a sense just the opposite of the first;
for one could agree that spaying Fluffy harms her, and maintain that it benefits her as well. If it can
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plausibly be maintained that the benefits to Fluffy of her being spayed outweigh the costs to her, then
spaying Fluffy can be justified on paternalistic grounds, in much the same way that one could justify giving
her a rabies shot, and the practice would thus pose no serious problem for the attribution to her of a right to
respectful treatment. But there are two kinds of reasons to be dissatisfied with this sort of response to the
problem I have identified.
The first kind of reason is empirical and is based on the kinds of facts to which one might attempt to
appeal in defending such a response. For there are two kinds of benefit to Fluffy that might be appealed to
in attempting to justify spaying her on paternalistic grounds, and in typical cases, at least, it simply does not
seem plausible to maintain that these benefits are great enough to outweigh the costs to her. One apparent
benefit is that spaying an animal reduces the risks for developing breast cancer in females. But there are
three problems with appealing to this fact. The first is that the risk of developing such cancer in the first
place is not sufficiently high to make it clear that the reduction in risk would justify subjecting an animal to
the risks and harms imposed by the procedure itself. If you had a cat who you knew with certainty would
never breed, and if you took the animal to a veterinarian and asked whether or not she recommended
having the animal spayed merely in order to reduce its chances of getting cancer, the chances are good that
she would say no, and it would at best be controversial for her to say yes. Saunders Manual of Small
Animal Practice, for example, notes the preventative factor of spaying, but does not list the possibility that
an animal will later develop such cancer as one of the indications for performing the procedure.3 The
second problem is that the evidence indicates that the most significant risk reduction is produced only if
spaying is done before the animal’s first estrus, and that, at least in dogs, spaying loses its preventative
effect entirely if it is done after the age of two and a half.4 The third problem is that there is no comparable
benefit to neutering. Saunders Manual notes no significant preventative benefits to neutering and certainly
includes none in its list of indications for performing the procedure.5 Thus, even if the benefit from
reduction of cancer risk were sufficiently significant when it occurs to clearly justify spaying very young
cats and dogs on paternalistic grounds, the argument would still fail to justify spaying dogs once they are
over two and one half years old, and would fail to justify neutering dogs or cats at any time, and this failure
seems barely more tolerable than the failure to justify spaying and neutering in general.
The other possible benefit that might be appealed to in justifying the spaying of Fluffy on paternalistic
grounds is that it will spare her the burdens of any possible pregnancy that might otherwise have arisen.6
But there are two problems with appealing to this claim. The first is simply that, even if it is accepted, it
fails to apply to the case of neutering. Since males do not suffer any burdens when they impregnate
females, neutering them relieves them of no burdens. And the result that spaying is permissible while
neutering is not is, again, hardly less problematic than the conclusion that neither are permissible. The
second problem is that although pregnancy and labor impose a significant amount of physical trauma on
human beings, there is very little evidence to suggest that this is true of dogs and cats. Pregnant dogs and
cats do not seem to suffer from anything paralleling morning sickness or back pains, for example. Indeed,
one veterinarian I spoke to suggested that the only noticeable effect of pregnancy on cats was that they tend
to spend more time sleeping. And anyone who has spent much time around cats will suspect that, if
anything, Fluffy would be likely to welcome the extra sleep as an added benefit. The birth process, too,
seems to be largely untraumatic. Typically the cat will simply walk off to a quiet corner or closet and the
kittens will seem painlessly to emerge. There are, unfortunately, some exceptions to this rule, which
humans have created as a result of their desire to breed dogs to fit their idiosyncratic aesthetic tastes. The
English Bulldog, for example, has been selectively bred for a large head and small body to the point where
it is difficult and potentially dangerous for a female bulldog to give birth. So paternalistic concerns might
well justify spaying female bulldogs, though not spaying female dogs in general or neutering male
bulldogs. On the whole, then, while empirical considerations might plausibly tip the balance in favoring of
spaying and neutering on paternalistic grounds in some special cases, they cannot plausibly be invoked to
justify the practice in typical cases. And as a result, they cannot be used to overturn the claim that Regan’s
theory implies that spaying and neutering, at least in typical cases, is morally impermissible.
The second reason for being dissatisfied with the paternalistic response to the problem I have identified
is more theoretical. For suppose that spaying and neutering do turn out to confer substantial enough
benefits on the individuals involved to outweigh the harms even in typical cases. In that case, Regan’s
theory will imply that spaying and neutering is generally permissible. But it will remain the case that on
Regan’s theory, spaying Fluffy is morally permissible only because it benefits her more than it harms her.
And this claim, given the great overpopulation of cats and dogs, seems barely less counterintuitive than the
claim that spaying Fluffy is not permissible in the first place. The intuition that Regan’s theory comes up
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against is the one that holds that the easily preventable suffering to others provides legitimate grounds for
imposing on Fluffy the non-trivial harms and risks of harm associated with spaying her.
A third response to the problem I have identified might run as follows: I am willing to bear the costs of
feeding and taking care of Fluffy. But if she has kittens, I am unwilling to take care of them, unlikely to be
able to place them all in loving homes, and unable to accept the view that I’d have no responsibilities
toward them at that point. So I am only willing to take Fluffy in if I can spay her, and clearly she’ll be
better off being spayed and living with me than being left unspayed to fend for herself on the streets or in a
shelter. And given this fact, it is permissible for me to spay her.
There are two problems with this response. The first problem is that it applies only to cases where one
has taken Fluffy into one’s home. It thus fails to apply to those programs that temporarily capture feral cats
and sterilize them before releasing them into their original environments. But surely anyone who thinks that
spaying one’s own cat is permissible will think that such programs are permissible as well. The second
problem with this response is that it turns on the claim that so long as your actions leave an individual
better off than she would have been had you not intervened, then your actions do not violate her rights.7
And Regan is plainly, and justifiably, committed to rejecting such a claim. If such a claim were true, for
example, then an animal researcher who plucked stray cats and dogs (or humans) off the street would be
entitled to do anything he wanted to them as long as their lives were on the whole no worse than they
would have been had they been left on the street.8 But surely this is not permissible, and so the claim
needed to support this response cannot be true.
A fourth consideration one might appeal to is this. Regan is only committed to the view that normal
mammals have the right to respectful treatment once they reach the age of one, but cats and dogs can safely
be spayed and neutered before this point. So long as the procedures are done before this point, it might
therefore be argued, they are perfectly consistent with the animal rights position. But there are several
problems with this response. In the first place, this response still concedes that it is impermissible to spay
and neuter animals after this point, and as I have already said, this concession seems hardly less
counterintuitive than the original claim. In addition, Regan argues in other contexts that we must often give
the benefit of the doubt to those who we think may be subjects-of-a-life even if we have less confidence
that they are, and the same sort of consideration which he thinks should be extended, for example, to
mature frogs (e.g., pp. 366-67) would seem equally to apply to Fluffy even when she is only a few months
old. Furthermore, if we refused to allow that three-month-old Fluffy has a right to respectful treatment, then
it would seem that we are entitled to do many things to her that Regan and others would presumably find
objectionable, and could thus avoid one counterintuitive implication only by generating many others.
A fifth possible response to the problem I have identified is suggested by some remarks that Regan
makes about euthanasia. Regan points out that in most cases involving animals, the term “euthanasia” is
simply a misleading euphemism for killing. “Euthanasia” comes from the Greek words for good and death,
and refers properly only to those cases where a patient’s suffering is so great that it is believed to be in his
or her own interest to die. But in the vast majority of cases where animals are killed, say at an animal
shelter, this is done not to benefit the animal, but to benefit others. So what is often referred to as
euthanasia in the case of animals, is forbidden by Regan’s respect principle. But as Regan also points out,
this need not be so for all cases of killing an animal. In some instances, such as those in which a cat is
suffering from an advanced case of feline leukemia, the animal’s suffering may be so severe, unrelenting,
and untreatable, that it may truly be in the animal’s interest to die. Unlike a human patient, of course, the
cat cannot consent to its being killed, or leave instructions about how to treat it should it become
permanently comatose, but Regan sensibly argues that we can justify killing the cat as a form of what he
calls “preference-respecting euthanasia” (113-14). The cat does not, strictly speaking, have a desire to die,
since Regan presumes that she does not understand the nature of death, but it is plausible to suppose that
she does have a desire that the pain stop, and if killing her is the only way for us to satisfy this
overwhelming desire, then killing her is consistent with respecting her preferences, and thus consistent with
the respect principle.
It might be urged that this sort of argument could be extended to the case of spaying Fluffy. Fluffy does
not know that spaying her will prevent her from contributing to the already overcrowded population of
unwanted kittens. So we cannot say that she desires to be spayed. But if she did understand this, one might
argue, she would prefer to be spayed, just as if she understood the nature of feline leukemia, she would
prefer to be euthanized. And so what might be called “preference-respecting spaying” might be consistent
with acknowledging Fluffy’s right to respectful treatment in just the same way that preference-respecting
euthanasia is.
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This response is unacceptable for two reasons. First, it is just not clear what Fluffy would desire, even if
she understood all the relevant facts. The claim that she has a strong desire to avoid her own severe and
unrelenting pain is not very controversial, but the claim that she has a desire to prevent others from
suffering at some non-trivial cost to herself is much less so. And if we do take her to have this desire, then
it is very difficult to see how we will avoid justifying all sorts of other “preference-respecting” forms of
behavior whenever we can find ways to benefit others by harming her.
A sixth response to the problem I have identified appeals to the notion of a “wrongful birth.” Suppose a
woman deliberately conceives and brings to term a child whom she knows will suffer from some very
terrible genetic disorder that ensures that he will live for only a few months, and in severe, continuous and
untreatable pain. Most of us will agree that this woman’s behavior is seriously immoral, and a number of
philosophers and legal theorists have suggested that the best way to account for this judgment is to say that
it is a violation of the child’s rights. It cannot be a violation of the child’s right to life, of course, since the
woman is not guilty of killing the child. But it is at least arguably plausible to maintain that one has a right
not to be conceived if one’s conception can occur only in a manner that will make one’s life so miserable,
and if this is so, then the woman’s actions could count as a violation of this right. Suppose that there is such
a right, a right not to be wrongfully conceived. This might be cashed out in one of two ways: a right not to
be conceived when one’s life would be worse than no life at all, or a right not to be conceived when one’s
quality of life would fall below some specified threshold. In that case, then it might be that no matter what
we do, someone’s rights will be violated. If we spay Fluffy, Fluffy’s rights will be violated, but if we
refrain from spaying her, the rights of Fluffy’s kittens will be violated. Regan defends two principles to
govern our behavior in cases where rights violations are unavoidable, and it might be argued that these
principles, conjoined with the claim that one has a right not to be wrongfully conceived, suffice to show
that the permissibility of spaying Fluffy is consistent with the attribution to her of the right to respectful
treatment.
Regan’s first principle is the minimize overriding principle, or the miniride principle (p. 305):
Special considerations aside, when we must choose between overriding the rights of
many who are innocent or the rights of few who are innocent, and when each affected
individual will be harmed in a prima facie comparable way, then we ought to choose to
override the rights of the few in preference to overriding the rights of the many.
His second principle is the worse-off principle (p. 308):
Special considerations aside, when we must decide to override the rights of the many
or the rights of the few who are innocent, and when the harm faced by the few would
make them worse-off than any of the many would be if any other option were chosen,
then we ought to override the rights of the many.
Assuming that the harm of being wrongfully conceived is worse than the harm of being spayed, and
assuming that a typical feline or canine pregnancy results in the birth of more than one kitten or puppy,
both the directive to minimize the number of rights violations and the directive to minimize the harm done
to those whose rights are violated would point in favor of spaying Fluffy, despite the fact that this harms
her and that she has the right to respectful treatment. And if this is so, then Regan’s account of rights can
justify the practice of spaying and neutering after all. What shall we say about this argument?
One way to defeat it, of course, would be to deny that there is a right not to be wrongfully conceived.
But while I do have my doubts about the existence of such a right (for one thing, it is very unclear who the
subject of the right is, especially in cases where the right is respected and so the potential individual is
never conceived), I will not develop them here. For even if we accept the existence of such a right, the case
for using it to ground the permissibility of spaying Fluffy is subject to a variety of fatal objections. In the
first place, it is not clear that we can reasonably expect Fluffy’s kittens to have lives that are sufficiently
wretched to fall under the scope of the principle. Given the already existing overpopulation of cats and
dogs, we may well expect that at least some of her kittens will end up strays and that some of these will end
up being put to sleep prematurely in animal shelters, but this amounts only to saying that many of them will
have lives that are difficult and which include some suffering. It seems implausible to assume that their
lives will be worse than no life at all, and if we maintain that their quality of life will be insufficiently high,
the wrongful birth principle will almost certainly yield unacceptable results in the case of many human
beings. In addition, even if we were fully confident that Fluffy’s kittens would have lives that are
sufficiently wretched, we could avoid this problem without inflicting any harms on Fluffy. We could
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simply kill them when they are born, or as soon as they are weaned.9 And this prospect is no more
attractive than the prospect that we are not permitted to spay Fluffy in the first place.
Finally, even if we agreed that there is a right not to be wrongfully conceived and that Fluffy’s potential
offspring, in particular, have this right, it still would not follow that Regan’s principles would justify our
spaying Fluffy, and for a very simple reason: the principles apply only to cases where we will override
someone’s rights no matter what we do. But the case of Fluffy is not like this. If we spay her we will
violate her rights by wrongfully harming her, but if we do not spay her we will not violate her (potential)
kittens’ rights by wrongfully conceiving them because we will not be conceiving them. Fluffy will be
conceiving them. So it will still be wrong for us to spay Fluffy even if all of these claims are true. To this
objection, of course, it might be responded that we have a duty not only to refrain from violating the rights
of others but also to assist those whose rights are threatened with violation by others. Regan himself clearly
endorses the existence of such a duty (p. 249), and it might be thought that this would vindicate the claim
that we have a duty to prevent Fluffy’s (potential) kittens from having their rights violated. But even this
maneuver is unsuccessful, again for a very simple reason: Fluffy is not a moral agent. As Regan himself
emphasizes in explaining why his position does not entail that we have a duty to save a sheep from a wolf,
only a moral agent is capable of doing an act that counts as a rights violation, and so the duty to prevent
rights violations from occurring entails only a duty to prevent other moral agents from wrongfully harming
others. One could revise Regan’s principle so that it would entail our having a duty to prevent Fluffy from
wrongfully conceiving her offspring, but this would then imply that we also have a duty to save the sheep
from the wolf, and would thus again allow us to avoid one unpalatable implication only by embracing
another.
A final attempt to reconcile the practice of spaying and neutering with the attribution of rights to
animals arises from the recent work of Evelyn Pluhar. In Beyond Prejudice: The Moral Significance of
Human and Nonhuman Animals, Pluhar acknowledges that, on the face of it at least, such practices seem to
be at odds with the deontological ideal that we not interfere in the lives of nonhuman animals. But she
responds by arguing that “we have already interfered by participating in the process of domestication” and
that this fact, combined with “our willingness to take them in, results in acquired duties on our part":
Given this context, deliberately exposing them and their offspring to cars, abandoning them by
roadsides and streets, and dumping them in “euthanasia” mills is hardly tantamount to noninterference! It is
as deeply irresponsible as allowing one’s barely pubescent children to breed other children: “George, we
mustn’t interfere with little Hortense and her boyfriend! We must respect their autonomy!" 10
The argument from acquired duties seems plausible enough in the case of the duties we have to keep our
companion animals safe, well-fed and healthy. Surely it provides plausible grounds for supposing that we
have such duties toward our own companion animals while we do not have them to dogs and cats generally
or to the entire animal kingdom. But the argument cannot succeed in the case of the problem of spaying and
neutering. The reason is this: the argument from acquired duties shows how an act that would otherwise be
permissible but not obligatory can be made obligatory. It would be permissible but not obligatory for me to
buy some medicine for a sick child living in the third world, but if I were to adopt that child as my son my
special relation toward him could make the act obligatory, and the same would go for my relationship with
Fluffy. But the argument from acquired duties does not show how an act that would otherwise be
impermissible can be made permissible. And the problem about spaying Fluffy is not that Regan’s account
seems to imply that it is nonobligatory, but that it seems to imply that it is impermissible. If it would be
impermissible for me to sterilize a child in the third world, it is difficult to see how my adopting him as my
son could make it any more permissible.
Which brings me to Pluhar’s example. Pluhar compares our duty to spay Fluffy with a parent’s duty to
prevent her barely pubescent children from reproducing. But there are several important differences
between these two cases. In the first place, as I have already noted, we would think far differently of the
parents in question if they were to have their child sterilized rather than to keep her from having sex with
her little boyfriend. But second, and more importantly, a parent is presumably justified in preventing her
12-year-old daughter from becoming pregnant because it is very strongly in her daughter’s interest that she
not become pregnant at the age of twelve. The interference in the girl’s life is thus rendered permissible
because it is paternalistic in nature, and the paternalism may then be rendered obligatory by the fact that the
child is so young, that the potential harms to her from so early a pregnancy are so serious, and that she
stands in a special relation to her parents. But the problem about spaying Fluffy that I have identified arises
precisely from the fact that it cannot be justified on paternalistic grounds in the first place. It is not in
Fluffy’s interest to be spayed. And so the argument from acquired duties cannot help us here.11
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III.
I began by maintaining that there is a strong prima facie argument in favor of the claim that Regan’s
position commits him to the view that spaying and neutering cats and dogs is, in typical cases at least,
morally impermissible. I have now considered a number of responses which might be made on Regan’s
behalf, and have argued that none of them are successful. For better or worse, the claim that Regan’s
position commits him to opposing spaying and neutering seems to me to be true. The question now
becomes: how shall we respond to it?
There are, I believe, three possibilities. One is that we should simply bite the bullet. If we have been
persuaded by Regan’s overall case for animal rights, or by the more recent Gewirth-based defense of
animal rights found in Pluhar’s work, then we should be willing to oppose practices once we come to see
that they violate animals’ rights even if we would prefer not to. My argument seems to show that spaying
and neutering dogs and cats does violate their rights so understood, and so, on this view, we should oppose
the practice. I do not want my argument to be taken as an argument against spaying and neutering, but it is
possible that in the end this is the best way for it to be taken. A second possibility is that we should take my
argument as a reductio ad absurdum on the deontological approach to questions about our treatment of
animals. It may well strike us as little short of ludicrous to oppose spaying and neutering even while it
strikes us as not at all ludicrous to oppose factory farming, hunting, the use of fur and leather, and so on.
Utilitarian and rights-based approaches may do a roughly comparable job of showing that these latter
practices are immoral, and since utilitarianism can easily justify spaying and neutering while the rightsbased position cannot, this may count as a reason for thinking that in the end the utilitarian approach is
superior.
I want my argument to be taken as a defense of utilitarianism even less than I want it to be taken as an
argument against spaying and neutering. But it may be unreasonable not to take the argument in this way
unless we can justify a third kind of response. The third response is to say that my argument shows that the
rights-based approach of people like Regan should be preserved but amended. What is needed, on this
view, is an account that shows that it is permissible to impose relatively minor harms on animals (and
relevantly analogous humans) in at least some cases where this produces great benefits for others, and that
is not only consistent with the attribution of rights to animals, but is motivated by the same sorts of
considerations that justify such attribution. This, in fact, is how I think my argument should be taken. I
cannot attempt to justify taking it in this way here, but will conclude by very briefly sketching what such an
amendment might look like.
Suppose that an infant is about to step on a button that will detonate a bomb. If the bomb goes off, you
will certainly be killed, and there is no way for you to prevent the infant from stepping on the button other
than to kill him. Most people12 will agree that you may kill the infant in this case, that killing him does not
violate his rights, even though he is morally innocent, and so not responsible for the threat that he poses to
you. And the same would presumably apply if it were instead a dog that were about to step on the button,
even if a dog’s right to life were taken to be every bit as strong as yours and mine. One plausible account of
why this should be so appeals to the following counterfactual consideration: the infant (or dog) is doing an
action such that if he were a moral agent who understood the consequences of stepping on the button, the
act would be morally impermissible. Since this is so, on this account, we are allowed to prevent him from
doing the action even if our doing so imposes harm on him, provided that the harm we impose on him is
proportionate to the harms we thereby prevent him from wrongfully (though innocently) imposing on
others. If this is so, then one could by analogy argue roughly as follows: it is wrong to bring new animals
into the world if you cannot ensure that they will be well cared for. A dog breeder who breeds more
puppies than he can place in good homes, for example, does something seriously wrong. Fluffy cannot
ensure that her kittens will be taken care of. Were she a moral agent, it would be wrong for her to reproduce
under these circumstances. We are therefore entitled to prevent her from reproducing even if our doing so
imposes harms on her, provided that these harms are proportionate to the harms we thereby prevent her
from wrongfully imposing on others. Spaying Fluffy does harm her, but in relatively minor ways, and in
many cases this may be the only way we can effectively prevent her from doing what it would be wrong for
her to do were she a moral agent. And so, on this account, we are entitled to spay Fluffy after all.
The account I am envisioning here would circumscribe a set of cases in which it is permissible to harm
animals (and relevantly similar humans) in order to benefit (or prevent harm to) others. These harms would
not be justified on Regan’s account, and so this proposal does not count as reconciling his position with the
practice of spaying and neutering. Rather, it counts as curtailing his position. If the curtailing of his position
were accepted merely on the grounds that it would permit us to achieve the result that spaying and
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neutering turn out to be permissible, of course, then its acceptance would be unacceptably ad hoc. But I
have been suggesting that there may be independent motivation for accepting this restriction, based in part
on the plausibility of the idea that such counterfactual considerations are morally salient, and in part on its
cohering with other moral judgments we are inclined to make, such as those about cases of innocent threats.
And while the proposal I am sketching would impose a restriction on the range of cases in which harming
an animal would count as violating its rights, it would do so in a manner that is consistent with saying that
animals nonetheless have such rights, that factory farming, for example, is wrong because it treats animals
in ways that they have a right not to be treated, not because it fails to maximize overall happiness. This is,
of course, only a very brief sketch. I do not claim to have provided a sufficient reason for accepting it. But
perhaps I have at least provided some reason to think that it, or something like it, points to a more plausible
way of responding to my argument than the alternatives. And if I have not, then I can only hope that my
argument is wrong.13
Notes
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Strictly speaking, this is true only on hedonistic versions of utilitarianism, but I take it as clear on any version of
utilitarianism in which the interests, welfare, or happiness of animals is included in the utilitarian calculus, my modest
donation would produce more good if used to support spaying and neutering than if used to oppose factory farming.
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I will focus on spaying because it is a substantially more invasive procedure than neutering. requiring an
abdominal incision and causing greater post-operative stress and discomfort, but it seems unlikely that the harms of
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Saunders Company, 1994), pp. 904-5.
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Birchard and Sherding 1994, p. 882.

6
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It might be objected that the response I am considering need not depend on so unqualified a claim. In Taking
Animals Seriously (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), for example, David DeGrazia defends the
following principle to govern our treatment of pets: “Provide for the basic physical and psychological needs of your
pet, and ensure that she has a comparably good life to what she would likely have if she were not a pet” (p. 274,
original in italics). And spaying Fluffy would certainly be consistent with this principle. But the problem here is that
there is no clear way to get from Regan’s rights-based approach to DeGrazia’s principle (nor does DeGrazia claim that
there is).
8

In addition, a dog breeder can truthfully say of his puppies that they would have no life at all had he not intervened
in the course of things by having their parents produce them, and so if the principle needed to underwrite this response
were true, it would be permissible for him to do anything he wanted to these puppies so long as they were left with
lives that are at least barely better than no life at all.
9

Killing them would presumably be justified on Regan’s account as an instance of preference-respecting euthanasia.
It might be objected to this response that it is worse to be conceived, born and then killed than never to be conceived,
an argument that often arises in the debate over the moral permissibility of abortion. I have argued in that context
elsewhere that this claim cannot be sustained, and will have to settle here for simply asserting that death is a harm in
virtue of the fact that it deprives us of future experiences, and that it is not worse to have some experiences and then be
deprived of many more than to have none at all (see my “A Defense of ‘A Defense of Abortion’: On the Responsibility
Objection to Thomson’s Argument,” Ethics 107 (January 1997), pp. 306-08, and also Frances Myrna Kamm, Creation
and Abortion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 84-87). The analysis of the harm of death in terms of the
opportunities it deprives the victim of, moreover, is endorsed by Regan himself (e.g., Case For Animal Rights, p. 35 1)
10

Evelyn B. Pluhar, Beyond Prejudice: The Moral Significance of Human and Nonhuman

11
And even if it could, it would still prove unable to justify the permissibility of our spaying and neutering stray
animals, which again would seem a serious shortcoming.
12
Though not all. For an important argument against the permissibility of killing in such cases, see Michael Otsuka,
“Killing the Innocent in Self-Defense,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 23, No. 1 (Winter 1994), pp. 74-94.
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I would like to thank David DeGrazia and Dale Jamieson for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
paper, and Nancy Nathan DVM for guiding me through some of the veterinary dimensions of the issue.

Between the Species III August 2003 www.cla.calpoly.edu/bts/

